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“[The removal of the maasai from their land] may have been unjust,
politic, beneficial or injurious, taken as a whole, to those whose interests
are affected. [However, [t]hese are considerations into which this court
cannot enter. It is sufficient to say that even if a wrong has been done, it is
a wrong for which no Municipal court of justice can afford a remedy.”2
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
Introduction............................................................................................................................................... 1
Theoretical Background: Imperialism and Colonialism ........................................................................ 3
The Formation of the East African Protectorate........................................................................................ 6
Maasai Communalism and British Class Society: Transformation
Resistance and Reconstitution .................................................................................................................. 8
The Transmogrification of Maasai Peasantry and their Property Relations.............................................. 12
Creating Consent: The Invention of a Paramount Maasai Chief and
the 1904 Maasai Agreement...................................................................................................................... 16
Formal and Informal Empire in the East African Protectorate
and the Maasai Case.................................................................................................................................. 19
The Status of Protectorates Under 19th Century International Law .......................................................... 21
Contestation and Resistance in the Empire’s Courts and With
the Laws of the Empire ............................................................................................................................. 25
The Courts’ High Legal Formalism and Strictly Positivist
International Law ...................................................................................................................................... 32
The Crown’s Prerogatives are Limitable by Moral Principles or its
Good Will but not by Judicial Review ...................................................................................................... 33
The Dis-aggregation of Territorial Sovereignty
and Suspended Sovereignty ...................................................................................................................... 34
The Distinction between Power and Jurisdiction on the one hand,
and Territorial Sovereignty, on the other................................................................................................ 35
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 44
1
© Associate Professor, Albany Law School. An earlier version of this paper was presented as a keynote address in
a conference on International Law and Imperialism at the Birkbeck Law School at the University of London in May
2004. This paper was also presented at the Feminist and Legal Theory Project Workshop on
‘Across-Legal-Cultures-Post-Colonialism,” at Emory University Law School on September 10, 2004.
2
Ol le Njogo v. A.G. 5 E. Afr. L. Protectorate Rep., Part II 1914, 70 at 80.

1

Introduction

This paper explores the relationship between imperialism and colonialism in nineteenth
century international law.

I define imperialism, like late nineteenth century theorists, as

the spread and expansion of industrial and commercial capitalism. By colonialism, I
mean the territorial annexation and occupation of non-European territories by European
states. While imperialism was reflected in nineteenth century English rules of property,
tort and contract, colonialism was reflected in nineteenth century rules of acquisition of
title to territory. My exploration of the relationship between imperialism and colonialism,
has two objectives. First, to show that international legal doctrines surrounding British
protectorates of the nineteenth century did not distinguish between imperialism as
represented by the introduction of rules and practices of English private and business law
into the colonies, on the one hand, and colonialism particularly as exemplified by rules of
acquisition of title to territory, on the other. Second, to show that the imposition of
colonial rule went hand in hand with the imposition of English rules of property, tort and
contract which, in turn facilitated the expansion of industrial and commercial capitalism
in the East African Protectorate. Thus there was a close relationship between rules of
public international law in and those of English rules of property, tort and contract in
nineteenth century protectorate jurisprudence. To achieve these objectives, I use the East
African protectorate as the springboard for my discussion.

The relationship between imperialism and colonialism results in three major conclusions.
First, this relationship demonstrates that international legal rules of British protectorates
were internally inconsistent between their claims of liberty, on the one hand, and their
repressive and illiberal consequences for colonial peoples, on the other.
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Second, this inconsistency between the promise of liberty and the reality of colonial
illiberalism created room for resistance and reconstitution of colonial territorial
acquisition by colonialized peoples. I illustrate this theme of resistance and efforts at
challenging the illiberalism of colonialism using a High Court and East African Court of
Appeal case brought by the Maasai of the East African Protectorate against the British
government. My discussion of this case shows that this resistance was in part mediated
by invoking rules of English private law such as contract, property and tort as well rules
of public international law.

Finally, I show that the international law of protectorates produced a heterogeneous legal
milieu of the modern and the traditional that was no less productive of hierarchical
structures of colonialism than those already embedded in the national laws of colonizing
and imperial powers.

I proceed as follows: I begin by tracing the distinctions made in the literature between
formal and informal empire and by showing how the protectorate form of British
colonialism collapsed this distinction. I then proceed to show how the East African
protectorate government transmogrified Maasai peasant and property relations and how
the Maasai sought to resist these incursions in British courts. I proceed to trace how the
contestation and resistance of the expropriation of Maasai land in British courts is rarified
by a highly formalist and positivist jurisprudence that: argues that the Crown’s
prerogatives are limitable by moral principles but not by judicial review; disaggregates
territorial from suspended sovereignty; and that distinguishes between power and
jurisdiction, on the hand, and territorial sovereignty, on the other. Before concluding, I
trace the continuities between the jurisprudence of the British courts in the Maasai case
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with analogous contemporary jurisprudence – including that produced by the holding of
detainees in Guantanamo Bay.
Theoretical Background: Imperialism and Colonialism

Classical theories of imperialism -- especially those of European theorists of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries -- were never really centrally concerned with the
question of colonialism except as a necessary but peripheral appendage of imperial
expansion. 3

While my essay will focus on imperialism and colonialism, the term

“imperialism” has over the last century had many a meaning and its uses in specific
historical contexts have been varied.

It has referred to “despotic methods of

government,” the search for investment opportunities and markets for surplus capital and
productive capacity, “empire building,” “employing the power of the armed state to
secure economic advantages in the world at large”4 and expansion of capitalism which
refers to industrialization and commercial development in the periphery of empire as
opposed to territorial annexations or empire building.5

Thus I hesitate to present an encompassing definition of imperialism.
addressing imperialisms.6

Instead, I will be

The central themes tying these imperialisms together in the

colonial context are the different modes of “dominating, restructuring and having
authority”7 over colonial peoples both by European and other invaders as well as by
these outsiders in conjunction with local ruling elites.

One important dimension of the

imperialisms I discuss is that the relations between colonial peoples and their dominators
3
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Id. at 4.
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or overlords cannot be understood outside the prism of power, domination, hegemony
and control.

Thus the culture, economy, politics and entire complex of ideas of the

colonial relation are seen or regarded in light of the power of the force of these complex
of ideas or “more precisely their configurations of power.”8

Edward Said illuminatingly

reminded us why studying imperialism is important when he wrote:

“…to believe that politics in the form of imperialism bears upon the
production of literature, scholarship and social theory, and history writing
is by no means equivalent to saying that culture is therefore demeaned or a
denigrated thing. Quite the contrary: my whole point is to say that we
can better understand the persistence and the durability of saturating
hegemonic systems like culture when we realize that their internal
constraints upon writers and thinkers were productive, not unilaterally
inhibiting.”9

Taking up Said’s challenge, I will examine a number of theories of imperialism. In 1895,
the date of the declaration of the East African Protectorate, the British journalist and
socialist, H.N. Brailsford argued that the age of imperialism in Britain began. 10
Brailsford’s central thesis was that the British ruling and investing class had built the
British empire and were its primary beneficiary.

He argued that the British ruling and

investing class had achieved this objective through their control of British foreign policy.
As a socialist, he argued that the British government should be more transparent and
accountable for its foreign policy decisions. For example he argued in favor of
confiscating surplus profits of the investing classes as a means of overcoming the
imperialist tendencies of the British ruling class.

8

Id.
Id. at 14.
10
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Brailsford proceeded from the view that imperialism in the late nineteenth century was
the quest by owners of capital for outlets for their surplus funds in conjunction with the
armed force of the state.11

He saw imperialism as the expansion of capitalism in the

form of industrial and commercial development.

Thus, although European governments

were scrambling over territorial annexations and empire-building in Africa, this did not
constitute imperialism for Brailsford.12 For him, imperialism in the last part of the
nineteenth century was clearly distinguishable from colonialism understood as territorial
annexation.

Indeed, among early nineteenth century imperialism theorists, imperialism and
colonialism were two different things.

For example, Rosa Luxemberg’s and Karl

Kautsky’s work on imperialism was not predicated on the creation of great colonial
empires for investment, but rather on the establishment of an informal empire of free
trade commercial and investment interests.

Luxemberg sought to explain how

capitalism expanded as an economic system and, like Hilferding, saw imperialism as the
final stage of capitalism.

So far, I have made the claim that imperialism and colonialism were different things. Let
me now briefly examine how revolutionary socialists like Lenin regarded imperialism
and colonialism and if these revolutionaries espoused doctrines that were different from
them. Lenin was critical of both imperialism and colonialism. Yet Lenin supported and in
11

ETHERINGTON, supra note 3, at 176.
Id. It notes that theories of economic imperialism “may mean any of three things: 1) the use of the power of a state
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fact pursued Soviet conquest and justified it as the dictatorship of the proletariat over
“backward peoples.” 13

In effect, Lenin’s repression of nationalist movements to

establish proletarian dictatorship was no less aggressive than the colonialism of the
capitalist countries that revolutionary socialists condemned.

What distinguished Lenin

from Luxemberg was that Lenin’s goal was to account for and predict the outcomes of
capitalist expansion while Luxemberg’s goal was simply to explain how capitalism
expanded as an economic system.

The Formation of the East African Protectorate: The Convergence of Imperialism and
Colonialism
In June, 1895, the British Crown declared the East African Protectorate over what is
Kenya today.

The immediate reason for the declaration of the protectorate, without

consulting its inhabitants, was the inability of the Imperial British East Africa Company
to finance the administration of the territory and the refusal of the Crown to finance the
operations of the Company.
250,000 British Pounds.

The Protectorate was sold to the British government for

This ended the Imperial British East Company seven-year

trade and commercial monopoly.

The directors of the Imperial British East Africa

Company decided to sell the Protectorate to the British government to make the
company’s commercial and trading ventures profitable since the British government
would then assume the task and cost of administering the territory.14

The coexistence of imperialism and colonialism in the East African Protectorate is
evidenced by the British purchase of both the territory as well as the seven-year trade and
13

Id. at 193-4.
Mwangi Wa-Githumo, Land and Nationalism in East Africa: The Impact of Land Expropriation and Land
Grievances Upon the Rise and Development of Nationalist Movements in Kenya 1884-1939 200-04 (1974) (PhD.
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14
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commercial monopoly the Imperial British East African Company had enjoyed for the
seven previous years. In the conjoining of territorial control and the monopoly over trade
and commerce the British declaration of the East African protectorate of 1895 fused the
informal empire imperialism, which scholars like Luxemberg had already identified as
correlated with the growth of capitalism, on the one hand, with the formal empire of
territorial ownership, that the British were engaging in and that Lenin was actively
pursuing, on the other. In the fusion between colonialism and imperialism protectorates
collapsed the distinction between imperialism or the expansion of surplus investment
capital, on the one hand, from colonialism or the aggressive foreign policies of
conquering states in their territorial acquisitions, on the other. Thus as Kautsky argued,
imperialism was not the final stage of capitalism as Luxemberg and others had argued.
Rather, imperialism’s constant drive to expand as the purchase of the East African
Protectorate and its trade and commercial monopoly by the British government illustrates
was “one of the very conditions of the existence of capitalism.”15

Maasai Communalism and British Class Society: Transformation, Resistance and
Reconstitution

The declaration of the East African Protectorate in 1895 was the first stage in the
transformation of what we know now as Kenya today into a State based not on kinship
authority, but on the domination of non-producing class, the capitalists, over the
producers, the wage-laborers.

In a sense, contemporary Kenya, where the domination of

the capitalists is necessary to safeguard the appropriation of surplus value not so much
15

ETHERINGTON, supra note 3, at 120.
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through force but through “rights of property in the means of production and in the
product and by the impersonal operation of the market”, 16 is the State established
following the establishment of the East African Protectorate in 1895.17

The acquisition of the East African Protectorate by the British and the extension of rules
of private property, tort and contract into East Africa in turn interacted with preexisting
norms and practices of the African peoples in the protectorate. In this section, I will
explore how the communalism of the Maasai in East Africa interacted with the capitalist
mode of production that accompanied British colonialism. The extension of colonialism
and projection of imperialism into East Africa involved a process of struggle of
contradictory interests – in our case and taking a bird’s eye view, the Maasai peasantry,
on the one hand, and the British settlers together with the British appointed Maasai
“leadership”, backed by the force of empire, on the other.

The Maasai like many of the communities of the East African Protectorate were
communal or peasant societies governed largely through kinship ties rather than
centralized authority.

Colonial and imperial contact introduced new type of relationship

- a class society. Unlike a kinship society, a class society has State functionaries that lay a
claim on the society’s social surplus.
State functionaries.18

Prior to colonial contact, the Maasai had no such

In other words the Maasai did not have an institutionalized system

of surplus extraction like in a class society. The intersection of the Maasai peasantry and
their “leadership”, on the one hand, and the British settlers on the other, in the crucible of
16

Id. at 359.
Here I am not asserting a linear progression from pre-colonial Kenya, to protectorate, to colony and finally to state.
Rather, each of these are genealogical modes, each displaying its own unique dialectics and imperialisms.
18
Partha Chatterjee, More on Modes of Power and the Peasantry, in SELECTED SUBALTERN STUDIES 363 (Ranjit Guha
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colonial conquest and the bourgeois jurisprudence of British courts produced a dialectic
of external domination and resistance as well as new forms of domination essential to the
establishment of colonial governance and much later on the post-colonial state.

As we shall see, British colonialism in East Africa became a tragedy for the Maasai
peasantry.

As such, the imposition of colonial rule over the Maasai and the

expropriation of Maasai land met both of the conditions that Robert Brenner identified as
unambiguously favoring the supremacy of the interests of capital over those of the
peasants in the feudal duel between serfs (peasants) and lords: first, where serfdom (or in
our case Maasai peasantry) has been destroyed; and, secondly, where the emergence of
the predominance of peasant property is circumvented.19

Yet while the predominance

of Maasai property was circumvented and the Maasai as a community was adversely
affected by the expropriation of their lands, capitalist relations did not establish
themselves unambiguously – rather there was a continuity of Maasai pastoral practices
within the emerging capitalism of the colonial economy.20 At best the outcome of the
encounter between the Maasai and the British settler class was the beginning of a
dialectical struggle between two irreconcilable visions: one Maasai and the other British
as exported to the East African Protectorate by British settlers.21Moreover, this dialectical
struggle is complicated by the fact that among the Maasai there emerged a class of
leaders whose legitimacy was established by bourgeois forms of legality and without
consultation of the Maasai people.

Hence, the Maasai cannot and could not be

19

Robert Brenner, Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe, 70 PAST AND
PRESENT, February 1976, at 47.
20
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21
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understood as a homogenous communal or peasant group as will become clear in
discussing the treaties entered into on behalf of the Maasai and the British.

My goal in analyzing the intersection of the communalism of the maasai and the class
structure introduced by the colonialism of the British settler community is to open up a
space of inquiry by exploring the relationship between imperialism and colonialism.
Gaytri Spivak has, for example, written about broadening Foucault’s important work that
demonstrated the emergence of new forms of power in the procedural techniques of
European imperialism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries:

“Sometimes it seems as if the very brilliance of Foucault’s analysis of the
centuries of European imperialism produces a miniature version of that
heterogeneous phenomenon: management of space -- but by doctors,
development of administrations -- but in asylums, considerations of the
periphery – but in terms of the insane, prisoners, and children. The clinic,
the asylum, the prison, the university, seem screen -- allegories that
foreclose a reading of imperialism.”22
My project is this broader context of the intersection of colonialism and imperialism; for,
as Spivak contemplates, and as Partha Chatterjee reminds us again with reference to
limiting analysis of imperialism to “modern” forms and institutions,

[w]hen one looks at regimes of power in the so-called backward countries
of the world today, not only does the dominance of the characteristically
‘modern’ modes of exercise of power seem limited and qualified by
persistence of older modes, but by the fact of their combination in a
particular state formation, it seems to open up at the same time an entirely
new range of possibilities for the ruling classes to exercise their
domination.23
The genealogical and historically aware methodology I am advocating here has the
advantage of complexifying simplistic visions about the purity of anti-colonial struggles,
22

Gaytri Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak? in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE (C. Nelson & L.
Grossberg eds., University of Illinois Press, 1988).
23
Chatterjee, supra note 18, at 390.
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which portray non-western societies as classless and as “unanimously and heroically
resisting the onslaught of ‘western imperialism.’”24

Thus, for example, the establishment of colonial authority figures among the Maasai by
the British East African administration did not completely abolish Maasai structures and
symbols of authority; rather these western bourgeois forms appropriated Maasai authority
institutions and modified it to create the equivalent of a comprador class of Maasai who
in turn served to legitimate the expropriation of Maasai land.

Thus, far from ending

Maasai forms and symbols of authority, the superimposition of colonial administration
transmogrified them with a view to make them meet the demands of appropriating
Maasai land.25

The Transmogrification of Maasai Peasantry and their Property Relations
Prior to British contact the Maasai were a communal subsistence society.

They were

communal in the sense that they lived in large groups or clans that collectively owned
large herds of cattle, and they collectively grazed throughout the then unfenced Rift
Valley region of present day Kenya, moving from point to point depending on where the
best pastures could be found.

They were largely subsistence in the sense that their herds

were held for their cultural value to the Maasai, especially in ritual sacrifice and for food
rather than for sale.

24

ETHERINGTON, supra note 3, at 272 (further arguing that such a methodology has the advantage of non-western
societies had “ruling classes, exploited peasantries, subjugated females and slaves. [And that by] exploding the myths
of merrie Africa, spiritual Asia and other Rousseauistic fantasies [this methodology has] made cardboard ‘victims of
imperialism’ into human beings of flesh and blood. [This methodology also] implicitly challenge[s] the self-serving
propaganda of ruling elites in many parts of the world who find it highly convenient to attribute all the ills of their
people to the legacy of colonialism,”). Id. at 272.
25
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A major organizing principle of pre-colonial Maasai was defense from external threats,
particularly those of neighboring communities like the Kikuyu who were raiding them for
their cattle, and also to keep themselves and their cattle from destroying the neighboring
Kikuyu farmlands and settled homesteads.

In fact the Maasai were in the late nineteenth

century famed as one of the fiercest warring community in the East African region. They
used their permanent warring force not only to defend themselves but also to ensure their
uninhibited access to grazing their cattle in the East African region.

However, authority

among the Maasai was based on kinship and religious beliefs and not simply on
domination.

Maasai leaders were religious figureheads known as laibons.

The contact between the Maasai and the British in the period prior to the annexation of
the British East African Protectorate in 1895 occurred at a time when the Maasai were
experiencing declining fortunes.

First, there was a feud between two claimants to

become the next religious leader or Laibon.

Second, the Maasai were going through an

environmental and epidemic disaster that resulted in the sickness and death of millions of
their valued cattle.

Third, the emerging British administration in the East African

Protectorate, which was heavily biased in favor of settler interests in land, hung like the
sword of Damocles over Maasai land.

In the absence of these predicaments, the Maasai were otherwise known to have had a
relatively higher level of resistance to the imposition of colonial rule than neighboring
communities such as the Kikuyu for at least two main reasons.

First, Maasai

“livestock served as a barrier against colonial control”26 since the Maasai were not

26

ROBERT R. TIGNOR, THE COLONIAL TRANSFORMATION OF KENYA: THE KAMBA, THE KIKUYU AND MAASAI FROM 1900
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seeking to sell their labor to European farms or in the emerging colonial administration
for their livelihood.

In addition, Maasai warriors remained away from missionary and

colonial schools and wage laboring on European settler farms since they could sell off
their cattle to raise colonial taxes.27

By contrast, the Kikuyu, a neighboring community

to the Maasai, used their central geographical location in relation to the colonial
settlements not only to engage in commercialized small-scale farming and wage laboring
on European farms to pay taxes, but they also attended colonial, missionary and
ultimately Kikuyu established schools.

The second reason accounting for a higher

ability to resist British colonial rule was that they were unlike the Kikuyu, who did not
have “powerful and cooperative colonial chiefs...who were able to create rudimentary
instruments of local government, mainly composed of a large number of young followers
who did their bidding and that of the British overulers.”28

Let us now briefly examine how the aforementioned predicaments made the Maasai, an
otherwise highly resistant society to British colonization, amenable to colonization.

At the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century, the various
Maasai communities suffered a series of crippling internal wars over the vast seasonal
grazing lands of the present day Kenyan Rift Valley and natural disasters ranging from
droughts and famine to a small-pox epidemic and locust infestations.29
TO 1939

These problems,

7-8(1976). Further recorded epidemics that exacerbated these calamities included jiggers and rinderpest. Id.

27

G.R. Stanford, An Administrative and Political History of the Masai Reserve,(report prepared for the East African
Protectorate Government).
28
TIGNOR, supra note 26, at 7. Tignor also notes that the Maasai “looked upon their flocks as a safeguard against the
distasteful undertakings of what they saw the Kikuyu engaged in.” Id. at 9.
29

John Lonsdale, The Conquest of the State of Kenya, 1895-1905, in BRUCE BERMAN & JOHN LONSDALE, UNHAPPY
VALLEY: CONFLICT IN KENYA AND AFRICA, BOOK ONE: STATE AND CLASS 22-5.
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as we shall see below, were some of the immediate reasons accounting for the Maasai’s
softening attitude towards intrusion of British settlers into their lands in the Rift Valley.

At the same time, a majority of white settlers and the Protectorate government looked
down upon the Maasai as a backward community. This attitude together with increasing
settler demand for land laid a basis for seizures of Maasai land for settler occupation.

A

protectorate government publication reflected this attitude toward the Maasai in the
following terms:
“their conservatism has been so great, and their subservience to antiquated
tribal custom and tradition has been so powerful that it has proved as yet
impossible to alter and renovate their ideas.”30

This attitude laid an important basis for justifying the forced restriction of the Maasai
from their grazing land following increased white settler pressure on the protectorate
government to take such action.

While there was almost no doubt that the civilizing mission of displacing the Maasai’s
antiquated customs was justified on invariable goodness of the “blessings of science and
technology, of literacy and education, of peaceful communities and respectable
education,” some white colonists were worried by the cruel injustice that accompanied
this mission.31 Yet when it came to the appropriation of Maasai land for white settler and
commercial interests, this opposition – including that of the Secretary of State for
30

Stanford, supra note 27, at 1. At another place in the report, the report noted that, “the masai, who number all told
about 43,000 souls, possess capital to an average amount of rather more than one hundred and ten British pounds per
head. They are thus in all probability, the richest uncivilized tribe in the world.” Id. at 3.

31

George Shepperson, Introduction to the Fourth Edition, NORMAN LEYS, KENYA, at vii (1973). Another group of
colonists detested the “destruction by an aggressive, European imperialism, under the banner of ‘progress’, of the noble
savagery of the old Africa, as it seemed to them, its communal virtues, its simple but practical self sufficiency, and its
invigorating closeness to nature.” Id
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Colonies - was muzzled notwithstanding opposition from the secretary of state.32
Although it is disputed whether the British colonial government was responsible for
undermining the ability of the different East African protectorate communities to organize
the means of “survival, offence and defense”33 against the natural disasters facing these
communities at the end of the nineteenth century, John Lonsdale has argued that “it is
scarcely open to doubt that many more of the poor would have died had they not been
able to find new refuge in the civil and military labor markets of conquest.”34

Creating Consent: The Invention of a Paramount Maasai Chief and the 1904 Maasai
Agreement
Capitalizing on the dispute between two Maasai brothers on the ascendancy of a new
Maasai spiritual leader, or laibon, the opportunistic interests of some white settler farmer
and commercial interests coincided with Lenana’s desire to ascend his father’s laibonship.
While within the Maasai a laibon was only a spiritual leader, the expediency of the
protectorate government was to remake him to serve its interests. By appointing him a
paramount chief, Lenena was on the path to being a more a reliable ally whose authority
the protectorate government could use to gain control over the feared Maasai warriors
and the fertile Maasai grazing land in the Rift Valley. 35 From around 1893, the
protectorate government sided with the cooperative Lenana against his brother
32
33

34

Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.

35

According to Stanford, supra note 27, at 9. “From at least 1850 to the early eighties, the pastrol Masai were a
formidable power in East Africa. They successfully asserted themselves against the Arab slave-traders, took tribute
from all who passed through their country, and treated other races, whether African or not, with the greatest arrogance.”
Id. at 9.

16

Sendeyu.36 It was Lenana who finally agreed to have the Maasai vacate their rich grazing
land in the Rift Valley under the 1904 Maasai agreement in return for British recognition
that he was the “leader” of the Maasai.

Under the 1904 agreement, Lenana, together

with other signatories on behalf of the Maasai, who did not participate in writing the
agreement and who did not read the agreement itself since they could not read,37 agreed
that the Maasai could not be moved from the Laikipia reserve “as long as the maasai shall
exist as race.”

However, in 1911 the British administration in Kenya under enormous

pressure from settlers sought to move the Maasai again, clearly in contravention of the
1904 agreement. As we shall see, this second agreement was the immediate reason for a
judicial challenge – this case constituted resistance towards the territorial dispossession
of the Maasai.

Two familiar techniques of colonial governance were being deployed in the relations
between Lenana and the protectorate government: First, there was the creation of
“traditional” authority to legitimize British colonial governance through Lenana’s
enthronement as the leader of the Maasai38; and, second, the subsequent deployment of
Maasai warriors in British punitive and cattle stock raiding operations on the authority of
Lenana not only met the protectorate’s mission of military conquest, but also authorized

36
As early as 1893 Lenana was approached by the British to forbid maasai warrior raids into the neighboring German
Tanganyika mandate against Lenana’s rival brother, Sendeyu. Under the terms of the Berlin treaty, the British were
responsible for stopping encroachment of a rival power’s territory. This worked out quite well for both Lenana and the
protectorate government: Since the government did not have the military force to stop the raids, Lenana could be relied
on to forbid the raids, while the British in return promised to help Lenana military help if Sendeyo crossed into British
territory. Richard Waller, The Maasai and the British 1895-1905: The Origins of an Alliance, J. AFR HIST, xvii 4 (1976)
pp 529-553 at 545.
37

According to GIDEON S. WERE & D.A. WILSON, EAST AFRICAN THROUGH A THOUSAND YEARS 165: “The maasai
and their leaders had no important say in the transaction, as the only alternative to a voluntary move was forceful
eviction. Thus there was no ‘agreement’ on the part of the maasai to move. Moreover, their leaders neither participated
in the drafting of the ‘Agreement’ nor understood its full implications, couched, as it was, in a strange legal
phraseology,” Id. at 165.
38
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the very violence the colonial authorities had deplored of the Maasai.39

Let us examine both briefly. Lenana has been described as “the fulcrum upon which the
levers of British policy rested.”40 When the protectorate government appointed Lenana
an administrative chief of the Maasai, it was unaware that a laibon was a ritual expert and
not a political leader.41

Paradoxically, Lenana’s ascendancy as the paramount chief of

the Maasai resulted in his loss of authority, especially among the Maasai warriors upon
whom the British had relied to conquer recalcitrant “tribes” and accumulate booty.
Lenana’s inability to bring the warriors under his control also distanced him from the
British. Eventually, when the British reorganized protectorate forces in 1902, these forces
became an alternative to Lenana’s Maasai warriors. Consequently, once the protectorate
government had used what they perceived as the “savage force” of the Maasai to
establish themselves over East African Protectorate communities, they were in the pretext
of “civilizing” the “barbaric violence” of Maasai warriors, merely sanctioning the same
violence based on an exercise of legitimate or civil violence based on law and reason by
establishing a protectorate force.42

Paradoxically although he was now a paramount Chief Lenana’s authority was

39
40

See Lonsdale, supra note 29.
Waller, supra note 36, at 540.

41

Id. at 542. In 1901, Lenana’s status was elevated into a ‘salaried status’ with a monthly allowance of six British
pounds. Id. at 543.
42

Several measures were tried by the protectorate government to stop maasai warriors from their “barbarous acts being
performed under our [British] flag.” Waller, supra note36, at 549. These measures included the promulgation of a strict
code of conduct for punitive expeditions, Id. at 549-50. For a similar though not parallel experience among the
indigenous communities of Papua New Guinea and Australian colonialists, see Joseph Pugliese, Cartographies of
Violence: Heterotopias and the Barbarism of Western Law, 7 AUSTL FEMINIST L. J., 23-5 (1996).
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undermined by his collaboration with the British protectorate government.
Consequently, the British became the ‘dominant partners in the alliance’.

43

Maasai

interests were thereafter relegated to the side.44 Colonial governance created Lenana,
precisely to undermine his community and gain control of it. There can be no better way
of establishing how well this claim fits Lenana’s fate and that of the Maasai than to
examine the adjudication surrounding the Maasai agreements of 1904 and 1911 in the
Maasai cases.

The relationship between the various Maasai communities and their cattle and the British
as reflected by these two Agreements was based on the colonizing power, deception and
condescension of British colonial interests. Hence, Richard Waller has noted that while
the 1904 and 1911 agreements emphasized the “special status” of Maasai-British
relations in the East African protectorate, the agreements “in fact marked the beginning of
a long retreat from involvement with the colonial power and the replacement of a highly
flexible and innovatory response to the advent of colonial rule by a determination to keep
their society intact, which was both rigid and deeply suspicious of further innovation.”45
(49 words)

Formal and Informal Empire in the East African Protectorate and the Maasai Case
43

Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa, in THE INVENTION ON TRADITION 236 (Eric
Hobsbawm & Terrence Ranger eds., 1994) According to Terrence Ranger, “The colonial manipulation of monarchy and
indeed the whole process of traditional inventiveness, having served a good deal of practical purpose, eventually came
to be counterproductive [for the Maasai].” Id. at 236.
44

Waller, supra note 36, at 549. This was the process of turning the savage into a soldier, see Ranger, supra note 43, at
234.

45

See Waller, supra note 36, at 529.
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There are at least two imperialisms in Maasai/British relations in the East African
Protectorate.

The first was the expanding form of capitalism into East Africa, or the

informal empire of trade and commerce. The second was, of course, territorial
acquisition of East Africa to become part of the formal British empire.

I will first address the interplay between the informal imperialism of expanding
capitalism and formal empires of colonial territorial control in the East African
Protectorate.

As noted above in Part _, the Imperial British East African Company

justified its interest in this region on the premise that legitimate commerce or trade was
the best cure for slave trade.

Thus the Company’s objectives, and subsequently those of

the British administration after 1895, were justified by the humanitarian objective of
supplanting the vibrant slave trade that was primarily headquartered off the East African
coast.

To do this, the protectorate administration argued in favor of cutting links with

the rich financiers and owners of the slave routes and caravans off the East African coast,
who were mostly Swahili and Arab. The protectorate government argued that would
instead help establish agricultural plantations and ranching farms for European settlers
funded not by the slave trade financiers, but by flows of capital from the British
government and private sources in Europe.

Together with the introduction of rules of private property, tort and contract, these flows
of capital in turn helped to consolidate the establishment of an informal empire of trade
and commerce in the protectorate. Some critics have argued that the sources of capital
from Britain were too small compared to the expenditure necessary to establish colonial
administration and, therefore, that there could not have been economic imperialism in
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East Africa in the sense that Luxemberg, Hobson and others had argued.46

However,

such an analysis ignores the various forms and ways in which colonial possessions
became indispensable to British capital and industry for their growth and development
over many decades, particularly as protected sources of cheap raw materials like cotton.
In addition, capital flows to these colonial possessions generated enormous linkages of
political alliances that were indispensable to those involved on both ends of the
relationship, which in turn sustained the continued commercial and industrial links
between the core and the periphery.47 Thus, as Richard D. Wolf has convincingly argued,
merely focusing on economic aggregates to discount the case for economic imperialism
without specifics as to the underlying historically developed economic structures and
patterns and investment48 -- and I may add their legal forms-- is to miss a big part of the
picture of British imperialism in East Africa.

Having demonstrated the relationship between imperialism as the expanding capitalism
of empire and colonial territorial occupation, I will now proceed to discuss how rules of
international law mediated the conflict between the Maasai’s claim of a British breach of
contract claim, and the British government’s defense of its decision to move the Maasai
away from their land inconsistently with their promise in 1904 not move them again. To
do so, I will begin by briefly discussing the institution of a British protectorate as this was
the international legal institution that played the most crucial role in mediating the
conflict between the Maasai and the British.
Part II
46

D.K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire: 1830-1914, 1976

47

See Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, 1973; Kwame Nkurumah, Neo-Colonialism:
The Last Stage of Imperialism, 1965

48

RICHARD D. WOLFF, THE ECONOMICS OF COLONIALISM: BRITAIN AND KENYA, 1870-193029 (1974).
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The Status of Protectorates Under Nineteenth Century International Law

As alluded to earlier, in 1895 the British government declared East Africa a protectorate.
Protectorates were a very unique form of empire.

They were an interlude between full

annexation and the pre-colonial status. Scholars of international law like H.E. Hall have
argued that protectorates were a mode of avoiding assuming financial burden for colonial
possessions.49

The East African Protectorate lasted for twenty-five years – 1895-1920.

In 1920, Britain acquired full power over the whole country by declaring it a colony.50
However, the fact that East Africa was not fully incorporated into the British empire
between 1895-1920 did not hinder the protecting administration from opening up the
country to British settler occupation and controlling its inhabitants fully as if it were a full
colony.

In fact, many observers have noted that protectorates were governed as colonies

– which were, according to the logic of the Crown, the best example of territory within
the dominions of the Crown.51

Thus, while in the theory of British protectorates East Africa was a foreign country
outside the dominions of the British government, in practice and contrary to the East
African Court of Appeal decision in Ole Njogo-v-AG,52 (hereinafter the Maasai case(s)),
the East African protectorate was really a part of the British empire as much as it was
during the subsequent colony period.

The effect of the holding in the Ole Njogo case is

that although East Africa was a foreign country outside the dominions of the Crown, the
Crown or its representatives had unlimited powers in the protectorate.

49

H.E. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 27.
YP GHAI & JPWB MCAUSLAN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 20 (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970).
51
C JUMA & J.B. OJWANG, IN LAND WE TRUST 30.
52
Ole Njogo, et. al v. Attorney General of the EA Protectorate (1914) 5 EALR 14.
50
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Another paradoxical aspect of this case is that for the Maasai to prevail, they argued that
they did not have sovereignty since the British government was exercising full criminal,
civil, legislative, executive and judicial functions in the protectorate, and that it in fact
had complete control and jurisdiction.

Thus, the Maasai claimed that they, like other

British subjects who were under its complete control and jurisdiction, could bring suit to
enforce the 1904 agreement under which the Maasai were relocated to a reserve from
where the British promised not to remove them “as long as they shall exist as a race.”53

By contrast, on behalf of the British Crown, it was argued that the Maasai were sovereign
since a protectorate was outside the dominions of the Crown; and, since the Maasai
resided in a foreign country, they were sovereign by virtue of having territorial
sovereignty and had, as such, validly entered into the 1904 treaty.

The paradox here is

that it was the Maasai who were arguing they were not sovereign and the British were
arguing that the Maasai were sovereign, although in reality the British government was
both de jure54 and de facto55 exercising its full plenary authority as of the

protectorate

was a colony.

The Attorney General for the British government was, in effect, arguing in favor of a
fictional sovereignty for the Maasai by conveniently ignoring the fact that the Maasai
were a fully administered tribe of the Crown.

To advance this theory of fictional

sovereignty successfully,56 the Attorney General made rigorously formalist and strictly
positivist arguments seeking the court to recognize the East African Protectorate not for
53

Id.
By virtue of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act.
55
By virtue of Crown’s actual control of the protectorate.
56
The Court of Appeal for East indeed argued, “[a] declaration of a Protectorate in itself has no such effect, [making
the maasai British subjects], as in theory such a declaration presupposes the existence of both a protecting and
protected states and the continuance in the latter of some sovereignty.” Ol le Njogo v. A.G., supra note 2, at
91(emphasis added).
54
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what it actually was, but simply to accept the label of a protectorate being a foreign
country.

The Maasai, by contrast, made anti-positivist arguments to demonstrate that the positivist
arguments advanced on behalf of the Crown were spurious at best.

For example, the

Maasai argued that since an East African Legislative Council had been established, it
would not have been conceivable that the Maasai had any vestige of sovereignty left.57 In
addition, it is plausible to argue that British settlement over Maasailand that had began
occurring before the 1904 Agreement constituted a mode of acquisition of territory by the
Crown.58 Thus, as the Maasai argued, they were not an independent state capable of
entering into treaties. 59 Indeed, suggesting that the Maasai were sovereign was to
overlook the fact that Lenana, designated the Chief Laibon by the British, and all the
other representatives who supposedly signed the 1904 treaty on behalf of the maasai were
all chosen by the East African commissioner.60

The East African Court of Appeals disagreed with the assertions that the Maasai were
subjects of the British empire and instead endorsed the arguments made on behalf of the
British crown holding that the Maasai had validly entered into the agreement of 1904
since they had retained sovereignty to sign a treaty with the British government.

This

holding that the Maasai retained sovereignty to enter into a treaty, although they were a
protected group of the British government, was held sufficient to overcome the argument
that the Maasai had entered into a civil contract in relation to land cognizable in a British
57

Ole Njogo v. A.G., supra note 2, at 81.
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British
Jurisprudence, L. & HIS. REV. 439, 472 (2003). Note Morris Carter C.J. in the East African Court of Appeals judgment
observed that “[i]t has not been argued before us that East Africa has been acquired by settlement by His Majesty, nor
has the Court been asked to take any evidence upon this point.” Ol le Njogo v. A.G., supra note 2, at 89.
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court. In effect, in Ole-Njogo, although the British government’s jurisdiction in theory
was limited since Kenya was a protectorate and therefore not part of the British empire
like a colony, the Court nevertheless immunized the British government’s conduct from
judicial challenge.

By finding that the agreements were treaties, the court effectively deprived the Maasai of
founding their legal claims in equity or either in contract or tort. Thus the argument on
behalf of the Maasai that the British government failed its obligations as trustee to uphold
the commitments it made to the Maasai in the 1904 Agreement not to move them from
the Laikipia Reserve61 failed when both the High Court and Court of Appeal held them
to be treaties and no action could lie against them.

Similarly, injunctive relief

preventing the implementation of the 1911 Agreement for being in violation of the 1904
Agreement was dismissed as “it would in its crudest form be an injunction to officers of
the Government to prevent them from carrying out an act of State.”62 The action in
contract to enforce the 1904 Agreement against a move from the Laikipia Reserve63 and
the action in tort seeking damages resulting from the loss of cattle and failing to provide a
road as agreed in the 1904 Agreement were all held to constitute acts done under a treaty
and as such were acts of state against which the court could not entertain challenges
surrounding their validity or “even any circumstance impinging on the capacity of its [the
treaty’s] signatories.”64 Not even Lenana, the British appointed Chief Laibon of the
Maasai, could bring such a suit, the courts held.65

61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 79.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 78-9.
Id. at 78-9.
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Contestation and Resistance in the Empire’s Courts and with the Laws of the Empire

By going to the courts of the British Empire for redress, the Maasai were using a mode of
resistance and contestation that had been successful on behalf of the Scots in the
landmark Calvin case.66 The Maasai also relied on and from case law, particularly from
India and New Zealand,67 all which had in a variety of ways overcome the jurisdictional
bar of both the act of state doctrine or the claim that certain British possessions such as
the British East African Protectorate were foreign countries over British courts had no
jurisdiction.

From the Indian cases, the Maasai argued the principle that where courts had jurisdiction,
the British government could not make treaties - only agreements with its subjects.68
From the Nireaha case from New Zealand, the Maasai argued the principle that the 1904
agreement was an agreement as to land tenure under which the Maasai obtained legal
rights enforceable in British courts.69

Further, pursuant to Calvin’s case, which I will

discuss further below, the Maasai argued that they were not aliens in protectorate courts
and further argued that the question of whether the Maasai were British subjects was
irrelevant to their entitlement to a remedy in protectorate courts.70

By clothing resistance in the garb of contestations from prior encounters with the British
Empire, the Maasai lawyers were joining a long tradition of seeking to hold the exercise
of British colonial authority accountable by resorting to judicial review. In bringing the
case, the Maasai were arguing that the British government’s conduct within the

66
67
68
69
70

Id. at 81.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id.
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protectorate should be guided and reviewed by the same rules of governance applicable
between it and its citizens within Britain.

Most simply put, the Maasai case was

predicated on the view that British colonial governance ought to exercisable only in
accordance with the law71, precisely because, besides the powers it was granted by the
legislature, the Crown did not have any arbitrary power left,72 and further that if the
courts ousted themselves of jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, that would constitute an
arbitrary act.73

But in borrowing from precedents seeking to govern its colonial authority the Maasai had
to overcome more than the fact that the East African Protectorate was outside the territory
of the British Empire. Within the jurisprudence of the British empire, the Maasai were
aliens in more senses than the fact that their territory was outside the territorial
possessions of the Crown.

This is because since Calvin’s Case in 1602, the bond

between the King or Queen, on the one hand, and his or her subjects on the other, was
birth within the territory of the Crown by parents owing allegiance to the Crown.74

By

being born in the realm, a subject was liable to burdens to the public imposed by the
Crown and as such a subject was entitled to access to the Crown’s courts and to rights to
land.75

Calvin’s Case laid down the feudal logic that birthright was the absolute precondition for
enjoying the privilege of litigation and with it a remedy from the Crown’s courts. The
Maasai not only challenged this feudal logic but also sought to align with it. First, the
Masaai challenged this feudal logic by arguing they were members of the realm and not
71
72
73
74
75

Id. at 80.
Id. at 87.
Id .at 82.
Calvin’s Case, State Trials, 2:655, 77 Eng. Rep., at 408.
Hulsebosch, supra note 57, at 456.
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outsiders to it,76 both by birth in the realm and also because of the Crown’s control and
jurisdiction over the East African protectorate. 77 Second, by denying they were
sovereign, the Maasai sought to perfectly align themselves to the feudal logic of Calvin’s
case since being within the realm meant you owed allegiance to the Crown and that as a
society you not sovereign. To demonstrate that they owed allegiance to the Crown, they
argued that they could be charged for treason under protectorate laws.

The fact that the Maasai had what seemed to be compelling arguments consistent with the
feudal logic they were using to advance their case against the Crown and the fact that
they nevertheless failed is significant but perhaps not surprising. It is significant because
the Court found that the Crown owed no remedy to the Maasai notwithstanding that the
Crown had complete jurisdiction and control over the East African Protectorate. This
outcome was therefore consistent with the view that although the Crown had such
complete jurisdiction over and within the protectorate, the Crown’s courts did not. This
result is perhaps unsurprising because it was not the first time that the Crown has
prevailed in arguing the scope of its Courts did not reach outside the Crown’s realm.
Significantly, international law was necessary to buttress the unavailability of judicial
review in a protectorate.

Herein then lies the reason why the Maasai lawyers delined to use prevailing
international legal arguments to overcome the objection of the Crown that protectorates
were outside the realm and as such that judicial review as a shield against imperial
76

Ole Njogo v. A.G. supra note 2, at 81. Morrison for the Maasai argues: “This case should be read in the light of
Calvin’s case, where ‘alien’ is defined. A Masai is not an alien in the Courts of the Protectorate…” Id. Similarly, the
court observes: “At the present time [the masai]…say the sovereignty of the Crown in the Protectorate is complete, and
just as the Masai were formerly subjects of their chief (Calvin’s case), so they are now necessarily subjects of the
Government of the Protectorate, if not actually British subjects,” Id. at 105.
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Ole Njogo v. A.G. supra note 2 at 80 & 84. Morrison for the masai argued: “The compete exercise of the
jurisdiction of the Crown in the Protectorate in fact places the subjects of the Protectorate on the same footing as British
subjects.” Id. at 84.
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colonial governance was unavailable. In fact, rather curiously it was the domestic law
–embodied in the private law rules of property, contract and tort that seemed to offer
better hope for the Maasai than international law.78

The fact that international law did not offer much hope for a remedy in favor of the
Maasai is explained by the Court as follows:

“Treaties are the subject of international law which is a body of rules
applied to the intercourse between civilized states…[But] [i]nternational
law touches Protectorates of this kind (Protectorates over uncivilized and
semi-civilized peoples)…by one side only. The protected states or
communities are not subject to a law of which they never heard, their
relations to the protecting state are not therefore determined by
International Law…It must, however, I think, be taken to be governed by
some rules analogous to international law and to have similar force and
effect to that held by a treaty, and must be regarded by Municipal Courts
in a similar manner.”79
This quote is paradoxical. On the one hand, the Court finds that the Maasai were capable
of entering into a treaty, and on the other hand the Court also finds that the relations
between the Maasai and the British government could not be governed by rules of
international law since the Maasai had never heard of them.

One must necessarily ask,

if Maasai/British relations could not be governed by international law, how could the
Maasai enter into a treaty, which, by definition, is a creature of and is governed by rules
of international law? How could international law only be available for the purpose of
establishing that the Maasai could enter into a treaty but not for the purpose of
establishing if the treaty had been observed in accordance with rules of international law?
78

In this respect, I argue against the claim made by L.L. KATO, THE ACT OF STATE IN A PROTECTORATE 223 that by
giving preference to the domestic law of the U.K. common law courts downplayed the utility of international law in
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According to the East African Court of Appeal, its finding against the Maasai was not
based on the fact that the Maasai had no rights but rather its decision was the necessary
consequence that anything done by the Crown pursuant to a treaty was an act of state that
was un-reviewable in the Crown’s courts.80

Specifically, the East African Court of

Appeal noted in agreeing with the court below, “[a]ll that was decided was that treaties
had been made with the Maasai, and that they could not be enforced by Municipal
Courts, and that acts done by officers of the Government in carrying out these treaties
were acts of State and not cognizable by the Courts.”81

It seems obvious from the foregoing that the findings of the British courts were not
simply based on the act of state doctrine or for that matter the fact the protectorates were
outside the dominions of the Crown. Rather, the decision was also racist in so far as it
proceeded from the view that the Maasai were uncivilized or semi-civilized.

Such a

view of the Maasai proceeded both from the Court’s view of the superiority of British
civilization and Maasai backwardness and inferiority. In addition, the unavailability of a
remedy in the Crown’s courts as a result of conduct flowing from the Crown and its
agents was not simply inconsistent with the self proclaimed commitment to the rule of
law by the Crown, but also an implicit endorsement of the Crown’s otherwise illegal
conduct by its courts. The necessary implication of the decision is that the Crown could
engage in any conduct howsoever inconsistent with the rule of law in relation to peoples
considered uncivilized or semi-civilized residing in a protectorate even if the Crown had
complete jurisdiction and control. This attitude implicitly embracing colonial
misgovernance by the Crown is not lost on the Court. However, rather than acknowledge
80

Id. at 96. Morris-Carter C.J. argued “I did not find that the Chief Justice of the East African Protectorate has found
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not under the original jurisdiction of the High Court.” Id. at 96.
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the decision’s endorsement of colonial malfeasance, the Court apologetically but quite
likely unapologetically observed:

“The idea that there may be an established system of law to which a man
owes obedience, and that at any moment he may be deprived of the
protection of that law, is an idea not easily accepted by English lawyers. It
is made less difficult if one remembers that the Protectorate is over a
country in which a few dominant civilized men have to control a great
multitude of the semi-barbarous…If in the interests of peace and good
government it was considered necessary that the maasai should be moved,
it was a natural and politic course for the Government to come to an
agreement with them with this object in view.”82
Clearly from this quote, it did not seem that the court was making any distinction
between English law and English culture – the English were civilized and the Maasai
were not. As such, the British could really do no wrong, for civilized people are better
placed to make decisions over a multitude of semi-barbarous people.

Importantly,

anything done in the interests of peace and good government, God forbid, could not be
inconsistent with the mandate of the enlightened over the unenlightened.83

In fact, the

East African Court of Appeal cited Article 43 of the Berlin Act of 1884 to make the point
that a declaration of a protectorate over an uncivilized region came with an obligation to
establish a system of authority84 and such a system of authority over a barbaric and
uncivilized people was compelled by the needs of peace, order and good government as
required by Article 13 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act.85 Here we see a neat overlap of
the domestic law of the British Empire and international law insofar as both were cited
for approving the proposition that the establishment of a system of governance over a
82
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people within a protectorate did not constitute a denial of their territorial sovereignty.

I

need not emphasize that it is precisely the establishment of such authority that
undermines the argument that the Maasai were sovereign as the courts in this case found
the Maasai were.

The courts in this case were not unaware of this contradiction: they

had an answer ready-made, and the next part of this article addresses how the Court’s
high legal formalism and strict positivism filled in such inconvenient inconsistencies.

Part III
The Courts’ High Legal Formalism and Strictly Positivist International Law

As I noted above, to fully appreciate the legal construction of British East African
protectorate as laid down by the Courts in the Maasai case, it is useful to consider how
the Courts deployed the following distinctions and dis-aggregations to resolve the
tensions and contradictions in their arguments:

•

First, by arguing the limitation of the Crown’s prerogatives was available only
through moral principles or the good will of the Crown, but not by judicial review.

•

Second, by making the distinction between territorial sovereignty on the one hand
from suspended sovereignty on the other; and

•

Third, by making the distinction between power and jurisdiction on the one hand
from territorial dominion on the other.86

86
Id. at 88. Morris-Carter C.J. argued the East African Protectorate had “been annexed so as to become part of Her
Majesty’s dominion in the sense of power and jurisdiction, but it is not under his dominion in the sense of territorial
dominion.” Id.
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In my view, each of these distinctions and dis-aggregations are crucial and in fact are
persistent features of legal governance under colonial and imperial structures even in the
contemporary period. I will say a little about how each of them facilitated the outcome in
the Maasai case and point to overlaps with contemporary cases in my conclusions.

The Crown’s prerogatives are Limitable by Moral Principles or its Good Will but not by
Judicial Review.
Let me begin by saying a few words about the Courts’ finding that acts of state or indeed
the entire complement of the Crown’s prerogatives in a protectorate are not amenable to
judicial review and are only limitable at the discretion of the Crown by moral principles.
According to the East African Court of Appeal, the moral principles limitation on the
Crown’s prerogative is based on a number of premises, three of the most important being:
First, that in relation to a foreigner, the Crown can do anything and everything without
recourse to judicial review, while by contrast the Crown is limited in its powers in
relation to its subjects because it has authority over its subjects only as established by the
legislature.87

Second, the East African Court of Appeals argued that it is “settled law that the King can
neither do, nor authorize a wrong.”88 Indeed, it will be remembered that Sir Edward
Coke had long before reassured the Crown that the common law courts would not meddle
with anything done “beyond the seas.”89 Third, as we have seen already, the courts in the
87
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Maasai case found that common law courts have no jurisdiction over acts of state.

In light of these justifications against availability of judicial review in favor of the Maasai,
the East African Court of Appeal concluded that the only remedy in case like this would
be “by way of appeal to the justice of the State which inflicts it.”90

A treaty to which the

Crown was a party in Judge King Farlow’s view only imposed moral obligations on both
the Crown and the Maasai!91 These moral obligations, he like his brethren held, were
outside the jurisdiction of the Crown’s courts.

According to this logic, it was not really

that the Maasai were without a remedy, although they did not have one under the law;
rather their remedy lay “upon the sense of justice of the Government in dealing with their
claims.”92

The Dis-aggregation of Territorial Sovereignty and Suspended Sovereignty
I have already shown the Crown argued that the Maasai were sovereign because this
argument was necessary to establish a basis for declining to provide judicial relief. To
credibly argue that the Maasai were sovereign, the Crown had to demonstrate that they
(Maasai) had territorial sovereignty or dominion over their territory. Only then would it
have been possible to find that the Maasai had entered into a treaty ceding their territory
to the British. The major argument advanced to support this proposition was not the facts
on the ground to demonstrate effective control but rather the view that the East African
Protectorate was a foreign country outside the dominions of the crown. In other words,
territorial sovereignty was reduced to a mere technical sovereignty.
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It is noteworthy of course that to fortify this conclusion, the courts invoked other
justifications. For example, that until and unless there was a formal act of annexation of
the East African Protectorate, notwithstanding the Crown’s complete jurisdiction and
control, the Protectorate remained outside the Crown’s dominions.93

However, the Courts’ finding that the Maasai were sovereign raised the paradox that in
actual fact the Maasai did not have effective control over their territory as a sovereign is
presumed to have under international law.

Indeed the Maasai had given up their

territorial sovereignty in both the 1904 and 1911 agreements in addition to the fact that
settlers had began appropriating Maasai territory for themselves with the tacit and at
times explicit support of the East African Protectorate government.

To address this anomaly – i.e. the fact that on the ground the Maasai did not have
effective control although it was asserted that they were sovereign -- the court invoked
the idea that Maasai territorial sovereignty was in suspense during the period of the
protectorate “until territorial annexation” took place in 1920. 94 This argument that
Maasai sovereignty was in suspense is also attributed to Westlake, a leading international
legal expert of such colonial cases.95 The East African Court of Appeal, presumably to be
parsimonious in its finding that the Maasai were sovereign, further argued that the East
African Protectorate was a foreign country and that the exercise of a full range of
arguably sovereign rights and powers within the Protectorate by the Crown were
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“distinguish[able] from territorial sovereignty by however thin a line.”96

The Distinction between Power and Jurisdiction on the one hand, and Territorial
Sovereignty, on the other
Another way of framing the distinction between territorial dominion and suspended
sovereignty was the East African Court of Appeal’s distinction between power and
jurisdiction exercised by the Crown in the Protectorate on the one hand, from territorial
sovereignty on the other.

As we have noted above, one of the ways that this distinction

was maintained was by the insistence on Maasai territorial sovereignty and especially the
fact that it was suspended.

Another way in which Maasai territorial sovereignty was

insisted on was not so much in its suspension or thinness during the protectorate period
but rather in its existence in the pre-protectorate period.

Thus, the East African Court of

Appeal argued:

“It is at least arguable that this [section 46 of the Native Courts Regulation
of 1897 recognizing jurisdiction of tribal chiefs] recognition of jurisdiction
pre-existent to and part from jurisdiction conferred by the Order in
Council, and is a remnant of sovereignty still remaining in the maasai; if
this be so a further reason is furnished for considering that a treaty might
be made with the maasai.”97
What is really striking about this quote is the quality of the obsessiveness in seeking a
basis, whatever basis, for establishing that the Maasai could enter into a treaty with the
Crown.

This obsessiveness was driven in large measure to establish that there could not

be judicial redress for an act of state; for once the agreements were designated treaties,
they were automatically clothed in the garb of untouchable acts of state by the Crown’s
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courts.98

Another aspect of this obsessiveness was the trouble the Court took to establish that the
powers and various jurisdictional competencies exercised under the authority and
instructions of the Crown through the Secretary of State for Colonies99 did not constitute
territorial sovereignty but rather vestiges of sovereignty distinguishable from territorial
sovereignty.

Again, the East African Court of Appeal:

“Sovereignty can still be retained by a State which has ceded by a treaty
part of its territory with full jurisdiction in that part, there would seem to
be no difficulty in holding that, where an exercise by a protecting state of
the three elements of sovereignty takes place by sufferance [for a cause]:
(1), that exercise should not be deemed to carry with it more of the
sovereignty than is necessary; (2), it is competent to the protecting State to
permit some vestige of sovereignty to remain in the native authority; and
(3), the protecting state must be taken to have permitted this, unless and
until it has assumed full sovereignty by annexation.”100

I think that the most important aspect of the obsession with establishing Maasai
sovereignty notwithstanding the Crown’s massive involvement in almost all the
Executive, Judicial and Legislative affairs in the East African Protectorate is the finding
that the Maasai acquiesced in this involvement, and therefore it could not be understood
to constitute a violation or even a usurpation of their [Maasai] sovereignty.

What we see

here, especially in the creation of Maasai leadership through legislative efforts such as the
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Native Courts Regulation of 1897, are not simply juristic tools that contradicted the facts
on the ground, but rather the initial stages in the construction of a type of authority based
not kinship and religious belief among the Maasai, but one based on domination.

A

bourgeois form of the early State that was juridically autonomous but in fact subservient
to the interests of empire.

It is crucial to note that though the courts were wary of

inquiring into the treaties since they constituted acts of state, the East African Court of
Appeal in particular went out of its way to observe that the Village Headmen
Ordinance101 and the Native Courts Regulation of 1897 established a basis for selection
of persons among the Maasai by the Crown to make treaties with it for the removal of the
Maasai people from their land. Thus the act of state doctrine was a crucial device for the
court to preclude it from inquiring into whether those appointment by the crown from
among the Maasai to enter into a treaty with it could do so on behalf of the Maasai. By
declining to enter into such an inquiry with regard to the Village Headmen Ordinance and
the Native Courts Regulation, the courts in effect legitimated the establishment of
authority based on domination, for how they were selected or if they in fact represented
the Maasai people was irrelevant.102

It was therefore not simply the formalism of

appointment to office of chief that was crucial, but rather the effect the appointment had
in legitimating colonial authority by establishing status differentiation between the
Maasai chiefs as political leaders and the Maasai people as followers, even though there
was no consultation with the Maasai people.

It is remarkable how status differentiation

between leaders and followers by virtue of the superior rank of leaders gives the leader
authority to speak on behalf of the people and to make commitments on their behalf
101
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without consulting them.

By acquiescing to the authority of these chiefs, the Court in

the Maasai case was legitimating the authority of these chiefs to move the Maasai people
from their land once, and then again in contravention of earlier contractual commitments
not to do so. The Court was also sanctifying as un-impeachable the authority conferred on
these chiefs once dressed up in the bourgeois form.

My argument here is therefore that the juristic techniques of the bourgeois form
employed by the courts are not at all bothered by forms of authority that have been
established in accordance with bourgeois logic; it is totally irrelevant if such authority
had the democratic legitimacy with the Maasai people. The court was simply satisfied by
the fact that the Chiefs had been selected under the legislative authority of the East
African Protectorate,103 even if their selection and appointment was inconsistent with the
customs of the Maasai people.

As noted earlier in the paper, the designation of these Chiefs by the British in turn
established an institutionalized claim on the social surplus based on their political
domination of the Maasai.

In short, these juristic form of the chieftaincy among others

were crucial to the establishment of market relations that favored British settler interests
and those Maasai closest to the British at the expense the rest of the Maasai.

I want to re-emphasize as I have argued from the outset, that at best the outcome of the
encounter between the Maasai and the British settler class was the beginning of a
dialectical struggle between two irreconciliable visions: one maasai and based largely on
kinship, the other British as exported to the East African Protectorate by British settlers,
103
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and largely I would argue bourgeois and class based.

This dialectical struggle was

complicated by the fact that among the Maasai there emerged a class of British
designated leaders whose legitimacy was established by bourgeois forms of law and state
accompanied by state violence. However, this does not in any sense imply that Maasai
automatically fell in lock in step with their appointed leadership – they were and are not a
homogenous communal or peasant group.

Thus, the declaration of the East African Protectorate in 1895 was only the first stage in
the transformation of a pre-colonial largely communal community and its incorporation
into the global economy fast on the road towards what we know now as Kenya today -- a
State based not on kinship authority, but on the domination of non-producing class, the
capitalists, over the producers, the wage-laborers.

In a sense, contemporary Kenya,

where the domination of the capitalists is necessary to safeguard the appropriation of
surplus value not so much through force but through “rights of property in the means of
production and in the product and by the impersonal operation of the market,”104 is the
State that was established following the annexation of the East African Protectorate in
1895.105

Within this new bourgeois form, the consent of the Maasai became the quintessential
hallmark to mediate and respond to the anti-formalist and anti-positivist claim brought by
the Maasai that the power and jurisdiction exercised by the Crown in the Protectorate
undermined their so-called sovereignty that the Crown argued they had.

After all, a

declaration of a protectorate under prevailing jurisprudence did not extinguish but rather
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presupposed the continuation of “some elements of sovereignty” on the Maasai106 and it
was for this reason the Maasai were competent to enter into a treaty with the British.
Further, according to the courts the Maasai were “the subjects of their chiefs or local
government, whatever form that government may in fact take.”107

In addition, the Court fortified its decision by observing that crown had not made a grant
of a Constitution to the Maasai and as such this was evidence that the East African
Protectorate had not become part of the dominions of the Crown since there had been no
establishment of full British constitutional rule.108

Indeed, while the Maasai harped at

their lack of power and jurisdiction, which was being exercised by the Crown in the
Protectorate, the Court insisted that territorial sovereignty rather than those powers and
jurisdictional mandates of the Crown was the decisive test of who was sovereign.

To

further establish the case against the Maasai, the Court emphasized that no formal act of
annexation by the Crown had taken place to make the East African Protectorate a part of
the British empire.109
The Contemporary Relevance of the Maasai Case
The Moral Principles Limitation in Analogous the U.S. Cases
The argument that the Crown’s authority is only limitable by moral rather than judicial
review is not new in federal litigation analogous to the Maasai case. This threat can be
traced as far back to Justice Marshall’s decision in Johnson v McIntosh, where he held
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that “mildness, gentleness and moderation, with verbal, and not judicial, proceeding.”110
Another classic along this line of reasoning is Justice Sutherland’s famous dictum in the
U.S. Supreme court case, Curtiss-Wright. In this case, Justice Sutherland held that the
President’s foreign affairs power, unlike his/her domestic power, is not limited by
constraints such as the Bill of Rights – a view that the Supreme Court has recently
reiterated.111

Similarly, the finding of the East African Court of Appeal that common law courts had no
jurisdiction over acts of state has also been used by federal courts in the U.S.

Rather

than applying the act of state doctrine though, the Executive branch often argues that the
separation of powers doctrine constrains courts from interfering the Executive’s
constitutional authority to be the sole organ in the realm of foreign affairs particularly
during wartime.112

Another similarity between the Maasai case and contemporary federal court
jurisprudence is that just as the Crown argued that protectorates were foreign territory
outside the jurisdiction of the Crown’s court, the Executive branch has argued that habeas
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does not extend to foreign citizens abroad even where the detainees are held under the
complete jurisdiction and control of the U.S.

In addition, the Bush administration has argued that since the foreign detainees cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts, it does not mean that they are without
remedies.

Rather, they are entitled to diplomatic and political review and scrutiny and

as such are not without a remedy.

Let me quote from the Bush administration brief in

Shafiq Rasul et al. v George Walker Bush et al.:
“[The] responsibility for observance and enforcement of these rights
[Geneva Convention] is upon political and military authorities. [These]
rights of alien enemies are vindicated … only through protests and
intervention of protecting powers as the rights of our citizens against
foreign governments are vindicated only by Presidential intervention.”113

I raise the Bush administration’s argument in the Guantanamo detainee cases to illustrate
one of the overriding objectives in this project—i.e. to show the continuity, power and
resilience of a common doctrinal framework in imperial and colonial projections of
empire.

Of course this is not to suggest that the Solicitor General’s office in the Bush

administration has been foraging the archives for cases like the Maasai case to come up
with this argument. No, that would be giving them too much credit. Indeed the point here
is that these structures are so embedded in the jurisdictional power map of expanding and
conquering empires of the common law variety that one does not even have to have heard
of the Maasai case to come up with a detailed jurisdictional structure or the type of high
formalism and positivism like the one the Maasai courts came up with.
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A final example here is the reason given by Paul Clemente on behalf of the Bush
administration in the Padilla case in April 2004 before the Supreme Court. He argued
that there should be no judicial review of holding of enemy combatants or habeas and
when pressed what would ensure there was no torture Clemente argued that the US does
not torture and that the good will of the US was the best check against torture.

Distinction Between Power and Jurisdiction and Territorial Sovereignty
The distinction between power and jurisdiction, on the one hand from territorial
sovereignty on the other in the Maasai case is an important forerunner of the notion of
failed states – for how else does it differ from the juridical statehood of so many juridical
states that have no effective control over their territory114 or barely have the ability to
control their economic and political destiny?115

The Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy mobilizes this distinction by
arguing that states that cannot stand by themselves have conditional sovereignty.116 Some
scholars have even argued that re-colonization may be necessary to address the crisis of
failed states.117

Makau wa Mutua has argued forcefully that failed sub-Saharan African states blindingly
adopted the Westaphalian model of statehood and he traces the illegitimacy of the
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contemporary African state to the alien character of the Westaphalian model.118 Obiora
Okafor has also shown how international legal doctrines peculiar to Africa were invented
to ostensibly.119 Ikechi Mbeoji has also persuasively shown how upholding the fictional
nature of the Liberian state, the U.S. and European countries legitimized and encouraged
a civil war.120

Conclusion
This paper has sought to show how the British empire as a “byzantine network of
territories, jurisdictions, institutions, and peoples,”121 was built by unsystematic and
contradictory impulses. Thus, while the formal understanding of protectorates was that
they were foreign countries, the Maasai unsuccessfully argued that their sovereignty was
illusory because the British administration had complete control and jurisdiction the
British East African protectorate administration.

Clearly, both the oppressive and

contradictory nature of imperial expansion in turn informed resistance and reconstitution
and even though the Maasai failed in their efforts to use the right of litigation in common
law courts to resist empire. However, even though the Maasai were precluded from
exercising the right to sue the crown, the march of the common law in the establishment
of regimes of private law of private property, contract, tort and maritime law, to support
the expanding capitalist economy in the East African protectorate proceeded without
restriction.
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In conclusion, I am compelled to quote at length the words of Ewart S. Grogan, one of
the most well-known and richest settlers in Kenya at the time of the taking of Maasai land.
This quote in my view captures both the formal empire of land acquisition for settler
purposes as well as its connection to the establishment of regimes of private law to
superintend over the surplus of the colonial economy to the non-laboring classes:

“I will ignore Biblical platitudes as to the equality of men, and take as a
hypothesis that the African is fundamentally inferior in mental
development and ethical possibilities to the white man…. There was no
need for ‘mawkish euphemisms’ to wrap up ‘European land grabbing
schemes.’ What was needed was a ‘good sound system of compulsory
labor,’ it would ‘do more to raise the “nigger” in five years than all the
millions that have been sunk in missionary efforts for the last fifty.’...The
native ought to be compelled to work so many months in the year, this
should be called compulsory education.”122

Clearly, the colonial mission of taking territorial control was not conceptually separable
from the establishment of regimes of labor and tax law that forced Africans to work on
commercial plantations. In addition, the emerging regime of property law reflected in
individual ownership in land not only privatized land ownership but also disinherited the
Maasai of their collective ownership of land. Ultimately, both the project of territorial
conquest and that of the expanding capitalist economy built on the extraction of surplus
capital went hand in hand. International law was deeply implicated in this conflation of
formal and informal empire and in the creation of the modern African state.
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